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   There	   is	   no	   such	   thing	   as	   silence.	   Something	   is	   always	   happening	   that	  makes	  a	  sound.	   John	  Cage,	  ‘45’	  for	  a	  Speaker'1	  
 
And	  then	  the	  execution	  began!	  No	  discordant	  noise	  spoiled	  the	  working	  of	  the	  machine.	  Many	  did	  not	  care	  to	  watch	  it	  but	  lay	  with	  closed	  eyes	  in	  the	  sand;	   they	   all	   knew:	  Now	   Justice	   is	   being	   done.	   In	   the	   silence	   one	   heard	  nothing	  but	  the	  condemned	  man’s	  sighs,	  half-­‐muffled	  by	  the	  felt	  gag.	  Franz	  Kafka,	  ‘In	  the	  Penal	  Colony’2	  
 
For	   Susan	   Sontag,	   silence	   could	   be	   ‘hard’	   or	   ‘soft’,	   ‘raw’	   or	   ‘cooked’.	   Silence	   could	  convey	   aesthetic	   aspirations,	   philosophical	   ideals,	   the	   renunciation	   of	   vocation;	   it	  could	  be	  preparatory,	  meditative,	  or	  the	  ordeal	  itself.	  Silence	  might	  be	  a	  decision,	  a	  failure	  to	  decide,	  or	  the	  hesitation	  before	  deciding.	  It	  might	  be	  serious,	  dangerous,	  or	  devious.	  But	  it	  is	  rarely,	  actually,	  silent.	  Silence	  is	  only	  meaningful	  for	  what	  we	  might	  say	  about	  it.	  And,	  as	  Sontag	  lamented,	  we	  are	  always	  chattering:	  ‘One	  recognizes	  the	  imperative	   of	   silence,	   but	   goes	   on	   speaking	   anyway.	   Discovering	   that	   one	   has	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nothing	   to	   say,	   one	   seeks	   a	  way	   to	   say	   that’.3	   This	   article	   examines	   the	  Australian	  jurisprudence	   of	   silence	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   ‘right	   to	   silence’	   claimed	   by	   some	  criminal	   defendants	   during	   trial,	   and	   advances	   the	   position	   that,	   despite	   arduous	  effort	  to	  describe,	  classify,	  evaluate	  and	  protect	  silence,	  the	  law	  makes	  a	  lot	  of	  noise	  about	  a	  silence	  that	  isn’t	  really	  there.	  The	   most	   enduring	   contribution	   to	   an	   Australian	   jurisprudence	   of	   silence	  emerges	  from	  a	  murder	  trial	  heard	  in	  the	  Queensland	  Supreme	  Court	  that	  went	  on	  appeal	  to	  the	  High	  Court	  of	  Australia	  in	  1993.4	  Whether	  inferences	  might	  be	  drawn	  from	   the	   silence	  of	   the	  accused	   is	   today	  often	   regarded	  as	  a	   settled	  proposition	  of	  Australian	  law;	  the	  answer	  is	  ‘probably	  not’.	  People	  accused	  of	  crimes	  have	  a	  right	  to	  silence.	   In	   law,	   their	   silence	   means	   nothing,	   it	   adds	   nothing	   and	   it	   must	   not	   be	  subjected	  to	  interpretation.	  But	  the	  answer	  is	  persistently	  complicated	  by	  the	  ruling	  of	  a	  majority	  of	   the	  High	  Court	   in	   the	  1993	  case	  of	   the	  Austrian	  defendant,	   Johann	  Manfred	  Weissensteiner,	   accused	  of	  murdering	  his	   two	  sailing	   companions.	  There,	  the	  High	   Court	   ruled	   that,	   in	   that	   case,	  Weissensteiner’s	   silence	  meant	   something,	  and	   if	   he	   had	   something	   to	   say	   in	   his	   defence,	   he	   should	   have	   said	   it.	   Subsequent	  rulings	   of	   the	   High	   Court	   have	   held	   that	   the	   case	   of	  Weissensteiner	   is	   ‘rare	   and	  exceptional’,5	   that	   the	   expectation	   upon	   the	   accused	   in	   a	   criminal	   trial	   to	   give	  evidence	  would	  occur	  ‘seldom,	  if	  ever’;6	  and	  most	  Australian	  jurisdictions	  now	  have	  legislation	  preventing	  adverse	  comments	  being	  made	  by	  the	  judge	  to	  the	  jury	  about	  a	   defendant’s	   silence.7	   More	   recently,	   the	   High	   Court	   has	   determined	   that	   an	  accused’s	  wish	  to	  remain	  silent	  might	  be	  overborne	  by	  police	  officers	  who	  want	  him	  to	   speak,	   and	   the	   High	   Court	   has	   ruled	   that	   these	   defendants	   must	   bear	   the	  consequences	  of	  speaking;	  if	  there	  is	  to	  be	  a	  right	  to	  silence,	   it	  can	  only	  be	  claimed	  by	   those	   who	   keep	   their	   mouths	   shut.8	   But	   a	   re-­‐examination	   of	   Weissensteiner	  illustrates	  what	  is	  evident	  in	  so	  much	  of	  the	  case	  law:	  in	  criminal	  enterprises	  and	  in	  criminal	  procedure,	  speech	  and	  silence	  exist	  on	  a	  spectrum,	  and	  in	  shifting	  contexts.	  There	   are	   times	  when	   silence	   is	   impossible,	   and	   times	  where	   it	   is	   irresistible.	  The	  law	   is	   rarely	   sensitive	   to	   the	   contexts	   in	   which	   silence	   falls	   and	   those	   in	   which	  silence	  is	  broken.	  This	  article	  contributes	  to	  the	  emerging	  jurisprudence	  of	  silence.	  It	  argues	   that	   silence	   must	   be	   heard	   and	   interpreted,	   and	   it	   calls	   for	   silence	   to	   be	  distinguished	   from	   noise,	   sound,	   utterance	   and	   inadmissible	   speech.	   Mindful	   of	  Jacques	  Attali’s	  writing	  on	  music—'the	  organization	  of	  noise',	  but	  also	  formative	  of	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community,	   commonality,	   structure	   and	   power—this	   article	   recognises,	   but	   does	  not	  rely	  upon,	  the	  silencing	  effect	  of	  sound,	  recording	  and	  surveillance.9	  Also,	  Michel	  Chion’s	   writing	   on	   cinema,	   and	   the	   emergence	   of	   cinematic	   sound	   from	   silence,	  dwells	  upon	  sound	  as	  effect	   (but	  not	  as	   cause),	   and	  describes	   sound	  as	   the	   'added	  value'	  to	  vision	  in	  the	  production	  of	  meaning.10	  While	  both	  these	  writers	  recognise	  silence	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  negative	  space	  produced	  by	  sound	  (or	  noise	  or	  music	  or	  speech),	  this	  article	  takes	  a	  wider	  view	  of	  silence,	  encompassing	  all	  the	  acts	  of	  non-­‐speaking,	  as	  well	  as	  omissions,	  which	  are	  imaginable	  and	  achievable	  in	  criminal	  process.	  
—WHAT WEISSENSTEINER SAID Weissensteiner	  was	  on	   trial	   for	   the	  murder	  of	  an	  Austrian	   tourist,	  Hartwig	  Bayerl,	  and	   his	   English	   partner,	   Susan	   Zack.	   The	   couple	   had	   bought	   a	   36-­‐foot	   cutter	   in	  Cairns	  and	  were	  planning	  to	  sail	   it	  around	  the	  Pacific,	  sometime	  around	  the	  end	  of	  1989.	  They	  were	  expecting	  a	  baby,	  and	  were	  headed	  to	  the	  Pacific	  to	  escape	  from	  an	  impending	  nuclear	  war	   and	  world	   conspiracy	  of	   Catholics	   and	  Masons.	   Their	   boat	  was	   laden	  with	  power	  generators	  and	  a	  water	  desalinator;	   they	  were	  going	   to	   live	  self-­‐sufficiently.	  Weissensteiner	  was	  helping	  them	  to	  prepare	  the	  boat	  to	  sail	  and,	  in	  exchange	   for	  his	   labour,	  he	  was	  apparently	  going	   to	   join	   them	  on	   their	   trip.	  There	  was	   no	   evidence	   that	   Bayerl	   and	   Zack	   ever	   reached	   the	   Pacific;	   indeed	   there	   are	  doubts	  as	  to	  whether	  they	  ever	  left	  Cairns.	  They	  were	  never	  seen	  again,	  their	  bank	  accounts	  were	  not	  accessed	  and	  they	  made	  no	  further	  contact	  with	  their	  families.	  Their	  boat,	  with	  Weissensteiner	  aboard,	  was	  eventually	  discovered	  in	  Majuro	  in	  the	   Marshall	   Islands.	   He	   had	   spent	   eight	   months	   sailing	   the	   Pacific;	   he	   was	  apparently	   turned	   away	   from	   Bougainville	   by	   the	   Papua	   New	   Guinea	   Navy,	   spent	  several	  days	  in	  Kosrae	  in	  the	  Federated	  States	  of	  Micronesia,	  then	  sailed	  to	  Kiribati	  before	  arriving	  in	  the	  Marshall	  Islands	  where,	  after	  three	  months,	  Interpol	  searches	  finally	   caught	   up	   with	   him.	   On	   board	   the	   boat	   was	   found	   Bayerl’s	   bible,	   a	   family	  heirloom	  which	   he	   always	   carried	  with	   him.	   Also	   on	   board	  were	   Zack’s	   antenatal	  vitamins,	   and	   the	   nappies,	   maternity	   bras	   and	   baby	   clothes	   she	   had	   bought	   in	  anticipation	  of	  her	  baby’s	  birth.	  	  In	  early	  1990,	  when	  the	  boat	  was	  still	  in	  Cairns	  harbour,	  Weissensteiner	  spoke	  to	  an	  immigration	  official,	  whom	  he	  told	  Bayerl	  was	  visiting	  friends	  in	  Kuranda	  and	  would	   be	   back	   in	   Cairns	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	  month.	   But	   on	   the	   same	   day,	   he	   told	   a	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customs	  official	  that	  the	  owner	  of	  the	  boat	  was	  in	  Port	  Moresby.	  The	  following	  day,	  a	  port	  officer	  spoke	  to	  Weissensteiner;	  he	  had	  received	  an	  urgent	  message	  from	  Zack’s	  mother,	  who	  wanted	   to	  get	   in	   touch	  with	  Susan	   to	   tell	  her	   that	  her	  younger	   sister	  had	  died.	  Weissensteiner	   said	   the	   boat’s	   owners	  were	   in	   the	  Atherton	  Tablelands,	  and	   that	   he	   would	   pass	   on	   the	   message,	   although	   Zack	   never	   made	   any	   further	  contact	  with	  her	  family	  or	  anyone	  else.	  In	  Kosrae,	  Weissensteiner	  told	  several	  people	  he	  had	  bought	  the	  boat	  from	  an	  old	  man	  in	  Cairns.	  In	  Kiribati,	  he	  told	  a	  customs	  officer	  that	  Bayerl	  and	  Zack	  owned	  the	   boat	   and	   they	  were	   in	   Cairns,	   but	   he	   told	   a	   police	   officer	   in	   Kiribati	   that	   they	  were	   in	   Kununurra	   and	   had	   lent	   him	   the	   boat.	   On	   the	   Marshall	   Islands	   he	   told	  somebody	  that	  he	  had	  taken	  them	  to	  Bougainville	  where	  they	  were	  smuggling	  arms.	  When	   he	  was	   located	   in	   the	  Marshall	   Islands,	  Weissensteiner	  was	   taken	   into	  custody	  in	  Majuro	  and	  interviewed	  separately	  by	  both	  local	  police	  and	  an	  Australian	  police	  officer.	  He	  told	  them,	  in	  different	  accounts,	  that	  Bayerl	  and	  Zack	  were	  actually	  in	  Western	  Australia,	  having	  left	  Cairns	  before	  Christmas	  with	  a	  small	  backpack.	  He	  told	   the	   Australian	   policeman	   that	   his	   earlier	   explanations	   for	   their	   whereabouts	  were	   lies.	  While	   in	   custody	   in	  Majuro,	  he	   told	   a	   journalist,	   ‘But	   they	  have	  nothing.	  They	  have	  no	  bodies.	  They	  have	  no	  proof.’	  Following	  a	  failed	  attempt	  to	  escape	  from	  custody,	  he	  was	  re-­‐captured,	   returned	   to	  Cairns	  and	   formally	  charged	  with	  double	  murder.	  In	  an	  Australian	  prison,	  he	  told	  another	  prisoner,	  in	  German,	  ‘They’ll	  never	  find	  those	  two.’11	  After	  doing	  all	   this	   talking,	  Weissensteiner’s	  decision,	  at	  his	   trial,	   to	  rely	  upon	  his	  right	  to	  silence	  is	  simultaneously	  obvious	  and	  inexplicable.	  In	  the	  face	  of	  all	  this	  explaining,	  what	  more	  could	  he	  say?	  But	  then	  what	  might	  his	  silence	  mean?	  He	  did	  not	   enter	   the	  witness	   box	   to	   testify	   in	   his	   own	   defence,	   nor	   did	   he	   call	   any	   other	  evidence	   that	   would	   positively	   support	   any	   defence.	   At	   trial,	   his	   counsel	   cross-­‐examined	  the	  witnesses	  called	  by	  the	  Crown,	  and	  through	  this	  questioning	  seemed	  to	   suggest	   that	   both	   the	   Western	   Australia	   theory	   and	   the	   Bougainville	   theory	  provided	  a	  reasonable	  doubt	  about	  the	  Crown’s	  case	  that	  Zack	  and	  Bayerl	  were	  dead	  and	  that	  they	  were	  killed	  by	  Weissensteiner.	  In	  criminal	  proceedings,	  the	  Crown	  has	  the	  burden	  of	  proving	  the	  charges	  beyond	  reasonable	  doubt.	  A	  defendant	  does	  not	  need	  to	  do	  anything	  to	  assist	  the	  Crown	  in	  discharging	  that	  burden;	  the	  defendant	  is	  not	  obliged	  to	  do	  or	  say	  anything	  in	  their	  defence.	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  strategy	  (but	  not	  as	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a	  matter	  of	   law)	  a	  defendant	  need	  only	  do	  or	  say	  something	   if	   it	  seems	   likely	   that,	  otherwise,	  the	  Crown	  might	  discharge	  its	  burden.	  Weissensteiner’s	  defence	  strategy	  was	   to	   raise	   doubt	   by	   challenging	   or	   questioning	   the	   evidence	   adduced	   by	   the	  prosecution.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  trial,	  the	  judge	  gave	  directions	  to	  the	  jury,	  which	  made	  it	  clear	  that	   the	  Crown	  bears	   the	  onus	  of	  proving	  guilt	  beyond	  reasonable	  doubt,	   and	   that	  the	  defendant	  has	  nothing	  to	  prove.	  He	  also	  said	  that	  where	  the	  Crown	  case	  requires	  the	  jurors	  to	  draw	  certain	  inferences	  about	  the	  evidence:	  Such	  an	  inference	  may	  be	  more	  safely	  drawn	  from	  the	  proven	  facts	  when	  an	  accused	  person	  elects	  not	  to	  give	  evidence	  of	  relevant	  facts	  which	  it	  can	  easily	  be	  perceived	  must	  be	  within	  his	  knowledge.12	  The	   jury	   convicted	  Weissensteiner,	   and	  on	  his	   appeals	   to	   the	  Queensland	  Court	  of	  Appeal,	  and	  later	  the	  High	  Court	  of	  Australia,	  he	  argued	  that	  the	  judge	  had	  wrongly	  directed	   the	   jury	   about	   what	   inferences	   might	   be	   drawn	   from	   his	   silence.13	   He	  ultimately	   spent	   fourteen	   years	   serving	   his	   sentence	   in	   a	   prison	   in	   far-­‐north	  Queensland	  before	  being	  deported	  to	  Austria.14	  Weissensteiner	  took	  many	  opportunities	  to	  say	  something	  when	  he	  could	  have	  elected	   to	   say	   nothing.	   And	   he	   said	   nothing	   when	   he	   had	   the	   opportunity	   to	   say	  something.	  Only	   two	  of	   these	  opportunities	   for	   speaking	  are	   regulated	  by	   the	   law;	  these	   are	   the	   police	   interview	   and	   the	   trial	   itself.	   At	   the	   time	   of	   both	   these	  opportunities	   to	   speak,	   the	   rules	   of	   criminal	   procedure	   and	   the	   laws	   of	   evidence	  need	   to	   ensure	   the	   accused	   knows	   that	   they	   have	   a	   choice	   whether	   to	   speak	   or	  remain	   silent,	   and	   that	   they	   are	   empowered	   to	   exercise	   that	   choice	   freely.	   The	  accused	  needs	  to	  be	  informed	  of	  the	  legal	  consequences	  of	  both	  speech	  and	  silence,	  and	  they	  also	  need	  to	  understand	  that	  the	  law	  can	  offer	  them	  certain	  protections	  in	  the	  exercise	  of	  that	  choice.	  But,	  as	  Johann	  Weissensteiner	  was	  to	  discover,	  the	  law	  chose	  not	  to	  protect	  him	  when	  he,	  at	  last,	  availed	  himself	  of	  the	  opportunity	  to	  be	  silent.	  The	  High	  Court,	  in	  its	  judgment,	  under	  strenuous	  exertion,	  tried	  to	  explain	  that	  not	  all	  silences	  are	  equally	  silent,	  and	  that	  sometimes,	  during	  silence,	  there	  is	  an	  expectation	  of	  speech.	  In	  their	  judgment,	  Mason	  CJ,	  Deane	   and	  Dawson	   JJ	   held	   that	   there	   is	   a	   difference	  between	  drawing	   an	   inference	   from	   silence	   (which	   is	   not	   permitted)	   and	   drawing	   an	  inference	   from	   a	   failure	   to	   contradict	   or	   deny	   facts	   that	   are	   within	   the	   accused’s	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knowledge.15	  While	  silence	  and	   failure-­‐to-­‐speak	  might	  sound	   the	  same,	  an	  adverse	  inference	  might	  only	  be	  drawn	  from	  a	  failure-­‐to-­‐speak,	  in	  circumstances	  where	  the	  evidence	  gives	  rise	  to	  an	  expectation	  of	  speech.	  In	  Weissensteiner’s	  case,	  his	  failure	  to	  explain	  was	  capable	  of	   strengthening	   the	  prosecution’s	   case,	  because	   it	   enabled	  the	   jury	   to	   draw	   the	   inferences	   that	  were	   sought	   by	   the	   prosecution;	   that	   is,	   that	  Bayerl	  and	  Zack	  were	  dead,	  and	  that	  Weissensteiner	  had	  killed	  them.16	  	  The	  High	  Court	  majority	  held	  there	  are	  only	   limited	  circumstances	   in	  which	  it	  would	  be	  reasonable	  to	  expect	  that	  an	  accused	  would	  explain,	  contradict	  or	  deny	  the	  prosecution	   evidence.	   These	   limited	   circumstances	   would	   arise	   where	   the	  prosecution	  case	  was	  of	  sufficient	  weight	  to	  support	  an	  inference	  of	  guilt,	  and	  where	  there	   were	   certain	   facts	   within	   the	   peculiar	   knowledge	   of	   the	   accused.17	   The	  judgment	  of	  Mason	  CJ,	  Deane	  and	  Dawson	   JJ	  made	   the	  additional	  observation	   that	  silence,	  in	  criminal	  proceedings,	  cannot	  be	  an	  admission	  by	  conduct,	  and	  that	  silence	  cannot	  be	  used	   to	   fill	   gaps	   in	   the	  evidence.	  Silence	   is	  only	  evidence	  where	   it	  has	  a	  bearing	   on	   the	   probative	   value	   of	   other	   evidence.18	   The	   dissenting	   judgment	   of	  Gaudron	  and	  McHugh	  JJ	  agreed	  with	  the	  majority	  that	  the	  trend	  of	  judicial	  authority	  supported	   drawing	   a	   distinction	   between	   failure	   to	   give	   evidence	   and	   failure	   to	  explain	  the	  events	  in	  question,	  and	  that	  it	  was	  only	  the	  failure	  to	  explain	  that	  could,	  in	  limited	  circumstances,	  give	  rise	  to	  an	  adverse	  inference.19	  They	  agreed	  there	  were	  only	   narrow	   factual	   circumstances	   that	   could	   give	   rise	   to	   an	   expectation	   of	   an	  explanation,	  which	   could	   include	   being	   ‘caught	   practically	   redhanded’,	   and	   having	  ‘special	   knowledge’	   of	   the	   offence	   above	   all	   others.20	   They	   agreed	   that	  
Weissensteiner	   was	   one	   such	   case,	   but	   would	   have	   allowed	   the	   appeal	   on	   the	  grounds	  that	  the	  directions	  given	  by	  the	  trial	  judge	  had	  been	  defective.21	  Today,	   legislation	  in	  most	  Australian	  jurisdictions	  prohibits	   judicial	  comments	  about	  the	  accused’s	  silence	  that	  invite	  an	  adverse	  interpretation	  of	  it;	  in	  law,	  silence	  means	  nothing,	  and	  a	  judge	  needs	  to	  be	  careful	  what	  they	  say	  about	  silence.	  Section	  20	  of	  the	  uniform	  Evidence	  Acts	  states:	  The	  judge	  …	  may	  comment	  on	  a	  failure	  of	  the	  defendant	  to	  give	  evidence.	  However	  …	  the	  comment	  must	  not	  suggest	  that	  the	  defendant	  failed	  to	  give	  evidence	  because	  the	  defendant	  was,	  or	  believed	  that	  he	  or	  she	  was,	  guilty	  of	  the	  offence	  concerned.22	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The	   High	   Court	   currently	   regards	   the	   ruling	   in	   Weissensteiner	   as	   ‘rare	   and	  exceptional’,23	   and	   holds	   that	   the	   expectation	   of	   speech	   from	   a	   silent	   accused	  interferes	  with	  the	  fundamental	  principles	  of	  the	  right	  to	  silence,	  the	  presumption	  of	  innocence	   and	   the	  privilege	   against	   self-­‐incrimination.24	  Also,	   in	  uniform	  Evidence	  Act	   jurisdictions,	  Weissensteiner	   is	  now	  inconsistent	  with	  section	  20,	  above.	  Others	  have	  written	   that	  Weissensteiner	   is	   ‘dangerous	  precedent’,25	   and	   that	   its	   reasoning	  relies	   upon	   ‘fine	   distinctions’,26	   is	   ‘elegant	   sophistry’,27	   and	   even	   ‘gibberish’.28	   The	  Australian	   legal	   scholar,	   David	   Hamer,	   has	   written	   that	   High	   Court	   judgments	   on	  silence	  ‘defeat	  even	  the	  most	  sympathetic	  reading’	  and	  that,	  after	  Weissensteiner,	   ‘it	  is	   euphemistic	   to	   deny	   that	   silence	   …	   is	   evidence	   of	   guilt’.29	   Nevertheless,	   while	  distinguishing	   Weissensteiner,	   subsequent	   High	   Court	   judgments	   have	   never	  overruled	  it,	  and	  it	  remains	  a	  strange	  island	  of	  good	  law	  that	  nobody	  is	  now	  likely	  to	  visit.30	  Consistent	  with	  a	  long	  line	  of	  authority	  preceding	  it,31	  but	  not	  applied	  in	  any	  of	   the	   judgments	   which	   followed	   it,32	   Weissensteiner	   might	   represent	   the	   final	  moments	  of	   the	   law’s	  realisation	   that	  we	  can	  only	  hear	  silence	  by	  attending	   to	   the	  sounds	  that	  surround	  it.	  	  
—CAN SILENCE BE HEARD? Noise	   gives	   context	   to	   silence;	   it	   is	   silence’s	   interpretive	   apparatus.	   The	   classicist	  and	  political	  scientist,	  Danielle	  Allen,	  has	  written	  about	  the	  convertible	  meanings	  of	  silence,	   and	   its	   vulnerability	   to	   having	   its	  meaning	   substituted	   for	   another—quite	  different—meaning:	  ‘The	  trouble	  with	  silence—what	  makes	  it	  politically	  difficult	  to	  make	  sense	  out	  of	   it—is	  that	   it	  can	  mean	  yes	  or	  no.’33	  Allen	  has	  written	  also	  about	  silence	  in	  Franz	  Kafka’s	  ‘In	  the	  Penal	  Colony’,	  his	  short	  story	  about	  the	  final	  hours	  of	  the	  operation	  of	  a	  judicial	  system	  in	  which	  silence	  has	  a	  crucial	  function	  during	  both	  judgment	  and	  punishment.	  ‘In	  the	  Penal	  Colony’	  belongs	  to	  Kafka’s	  much-­‐scrutinised	  writing	   on	   the	   theme	   of	   law	   and	   punishment;	   it	   has	   been	   studied,	   variously,	   as	   a	  parable	  about	  submission,	  or	  at	  least	  the	  gestures	  through	  which	  submission	  might	  be	   demonstrated,34	   as	   a	   work	   of	   religious	   judgment35	   or	   as	   written	   in	   a	   void	   of	  faith,36	  as	  a	  'pornological'	  account	  of	  sadism	  and	  masochism37	  or	  about	  the	  violence	  of	   language,38	   as	   a	   precursor	   to	   Foucault’s	   construction	   of	   the	   body	   through	  inscription39	  or	  an	  account	  of	  legal	  order	  displaced	  onto	  a	  machine.40	  In	  this	  section	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of	  the	  article,	  I	  draw	  upon	  Allen’s	  analysis	  of	  Kafka’s	  story	  for	  its	  recognition	  of	  the	  role	  of	  silence	  in	  criminal	  investigation,	  process	  and	  penality.	  In	  Kafka’s	  story,	  an	  eminent	  voyager	  visits	  a	  penal	  colony	  where	  an	  officer,	  loyal	  to	  the	  former	  commandant	  and	  nostalgic	  for	  his	  punitive	  spectacles,	  shows	  him	  the	  penal	  apparatus,	  a	  gruesome	  machine.	  The	  officer	  is	  both	  judge	  and	  executioner,	  but	  he	   knows	   that	   he	   is	   about	   to	   conduct	   his	   final	   execution;	   the	   condemned	   man,	  apparently	   unaware	   of	   his	   offence	   and	   his	   sentence,	   stands	   beside	   them	   as	   the	  system	  of	  justice	  is	  explained	  to	  the	  voyager.	  ‘He	  doesn’t	  know	  the	  sentence	  that	  has	  been	  passed	  on	  him?’	  ‘No,’	  said	  the	  officer	  …	  ‘There	  would	  be	  no	  point	  in	  telling	  him.	  	  He’ll	  learn	  it	  on	  his	  body’.	  …	  ‘But	  surely	  he	  knows	  that	  he	  has	  been	  sentenced?’	  ‘Nor	  that	  either,’	  said	  the	   officer,	   smiling	   at	   the	   explorer	   as	   if	   expecting	   him	   to	   make	   further	  surprising	   remarks.	   ‘No,’	   said	   the	   explorer,	  wiping	   his	   forehead,	   ‘then	  he	  can’t	   know	   either	   whether	   his	   defense	   was	   effective?’	   ‘He	   has	   had	   no	  chance	  of	  putting	  up	  a	  defense,’	  said	  the	  officer,	  turning	  his	  eyes	  away	  as	  if	  speaking	  to	  himself	  and	  so	  sparing	  the	  explorer	  the	  shame	  of	  hearing	  self-­‐evident	  matters	  explained.41	  The	   officer	   says	   that	   the	   condemned	   man,	   a	   servant,	   had	   committed	   an	   act	   of	  insubordination,	   having	   fallen	   asleep	  while	   on	   duty	   and	   not	   begged	   pardon	  when	  awoken	  by	  his	  master	  cracking	  a	  whip	  across	  his	  face.	  The	  officer	  explains:	  ‘That’s	  the	  evidence.	  The	  captain	  came	  to	  me	  an	  hour	  ago,	  I	  wrote	  down	  his	  statement	   and	   appended	   the	   sentence	   to	   it.	   Then	   I	   had	   the	   man	   put	   in	  chains.	   That	  was	   all	   quite	   simple.	   If	   I	   had	   first	   called	   the	  man	  before	  me	  and	   interrogated	   him,	   things	   would	   have	   got	   into	   a	   confused	   tangle.	   He	  would	  have	   told	   lies,	  and	  had	   I	  exposed	   those	   lies	  he	  would	  have	  backed	  them	  up	  with	  more	  lies,	  and	  so	  on	  and	  so	  forth.	  As	  it	  is,	  I’ve	  got	  him	  and	  I	  won’t	  let	  him	  go’.42	  In	   the	   penal	   colony,	   by	   denying	   the	   accused	   the	   opportunity	   to	   speak,	   the	   system	  prevents	  the	  accused	  from	  taking	  the	  opportunity	  to	  tell	  lies.	  Lies,	  in	  this	  system	  of	  justice,	   are	  not	  differentiated	   from	  any	  other	  exculpatory	  or	   inculpatory	   speech	  of	  the	  accused:	  the	  confession,	  the	  explanation,	  the	  justification,	  the	  alibi,	  the	  apology.	  It	  is	  all	  just	  noise,	  and	  the	  officer	  doesn’t	  want	  to	  hear	  any	  of	  it.	  Here	  is	  a	  system	  of	  justice	   that	   demands	   silence;	   its	   legitimacy	   and	   its	   respect	   derive	   from	   its	   silent	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conduct,	   and	   it	   goes	   to	   imaginative	   lengths	   to	   achieve	   its	   necessary	   silence.	   The	  apparatus,	   invented	   by	   the	   former	   commandant,	   has	   three	   mutually	   reliant	  components:	  the	  Bed,	  the	  Designer	  and	  the	  Harrow.	  Together,	  they	  work	  to	  restrain,	  gag,	   torture	  and	  then	  silence	  the	  condemned	  prisoner.	  Kafka’s	  officer	  points	   to	   the	  apparatus:	  	  ‘Here	  at	  the	  head	  of	  the	  Bed,	  where	  the	  man,	  as	  I	  said,	  first	  lays	  down	  his	  face,	   is	   this	   little	   gag	   of	   felt,	  which	   can	   be	   easily	   regulated	   to	   go	   straight	  into	   his	   mouth.	   It	   is	   meant	   to	   keep	   him	   from	   screaming	   and	   biting	   his	  tongue.	   Of	   course	   the	   man	   is	   forced	   to	   take	   the	   felt	   into	   his	   mouth,	   for	  otherwise	  his	  neck	  would	  be	  broken	  by	  the	  strap’.43	  	  Allen	  writes,	  	  The	  harrow	  and	  the	  felt	  [gag]	  do	  not	  collaborate	  merely	  in	  order	  to	  silence;	  their	   art	   is	  more	   diabolical.	   They	   first	   provoke	   the	   condemned	   to	   voice,	  and	   then	   silence	   him	   …	   The	   penal	   apparatus	   therefore	   orchestrates	   the	  force	  of	  voice,	  and	  its	  death,	  its	  final	  descent	  into	  silence.44	  	  Kafka	  describes	  a	  justice	  system	  which	  simultaneously	  knows	  that	  the	  accused	  will	  want	   to	  cry	  out,	  and	  knows	   that	   there	   is	  nothing	   that	  can	  be	  said	   that	  needs	   to	  be	  heard.	   The	   apparatus	   does	   not	   operate	   in	   complete	   silence;	   rather	   it	   allows	   us	   to	  hear	   the	  prisoner’s	  muffled	  screams.	  This	   is	  not	   silence,	  but	  an	  absence	  of	   speech;	  nevertheless	  it	  makes	  a	  dreadful	  noise.	  Within	   the	   complex	   modern	   jurisprudence	   of	   silence,	   there	   is	   one	   emerging	  theoretical	   analysis	   that	   seems	   sensitive	   to	   this	   approach.	  Here,	   the	   accused	  must	  keep	  silent	  so	  that	  we	  cannot	  hear	  them	  telling	  lies.	  Once	  they	  speak,	  we	  will	  worry	  that	   they	   are	   lying,	   and	   so	   we	   demand	   their	   silence	   and	   offer	   some	   limited	  protection	   in	   exchange	   for	   their	   keeping	   quiet.	   Daniel	   J.	   Seidmann	   and	  Alex	   Stein,	  professors	   of	   economics	   and	   law	   respectively,	   defend	   the	   right	   to	   silence	   on	   the	  grounds	   that	   it	   works	   to	   protect	   the	   innocent,	   and	   also	   that	   it	   prevents	   us	   from	  listening	  to	  lies	  told	  by	  guilty	  people.45	  In	  this	  defence	  they	  draw	  an	  analogy	  to	  game	  theory,	  advancing	  an	  argument	   that	  has	  attracted	  spirited	  resistance	  and	  debate.46	  They	  begin	  with	  the	  proposition	  that	   innocent	  people	  tell	   the	  truth,	  whereas	  guilty	  people	   fear	   being	   caught	   lying.	   Some	   innocent	   people	   find	   themselves	   unable	   to	  produce	   evidence	   that	   supports	   their	   innocence	   and,	   in	   these	   circumstances,	   they	  will	  exercise	  their	  right	  to	  silence.	   If	   the	  right	  did	  not	  exist,	   innocent	  people	  would	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need	   to	   give	   exculpatory	   statements,	   and	   guilty	   people	   would	   need	   to	   give	   false	  exculpatory	   statements.	   This	   would	   create	   a	   ‘pooling’	   effect,	   in	   which	   all	  uncorroborated	  exculpatory	  statements	  would	  be	  regarded	  as	   lacking	   in	  probative	  value,	  and	  innocent	  people	  would	  bear	  the	  burden	  of	  this	  pooling	  by	  being	  exposed	  to	   wrongful	   convictions.	   The	   availability	   of	   the	   right	   to	   silence,	   in	   these	  circumstances,	  thus	  operates	  to	  protect	  innocent	  people	  by	  removing	  the	  distorting	  effects	   of	   having	   their	   exculpatory	   statements	   disbelieved.	   It	   also	   prevents	   guilty	  people	   from	   having	   to	   tell	   lies.	   Here,	   the	   gag	   functions	   to	   protect	   the	   system	   of	  justice.	  What	  Allen	   calls	  Kafka’s	   ‘essential	   feature	   of	   the	   apparatus’,	   the	   gag	   in	   the	  defendant’s	   mouth,	   ‘the	   revolting	   silencer’,47	   enables	   the	   process	   to	   take	   effect	  without	   noisy	   intrusions	   that	   might	   otherwise	   distract,	   confuse,	   destabilise,	   or	  challenge	  the	  central	  assumptions	  of	  the	  system:	  guilt	  and	  punishment.	  	  The	   officer’s	   worry—that	   once	   the	   accused	   is	   afforded	   the	   opportunity	   to	  speak,	  everything	  will	  end	  up	  in	  a	  ‘confused	  tangle’—is	  echoed	  in	  other	  scholarship	  that	   engages	  with	   legal	   silence	   in	   criminal	  proceedings.	  This	   confusion,	   in	  modern	  Australian	   case	   law,	   centres	   around	   the	   inferences	   that	  might	   be	   drawn	   from	   the	  silence	  of	  the	  accused.	  Can	  silence	  be	  used	  as	  evidence?	  Legal	  scholar	  David	  Hamer’s	  analysis	  illustrates	  the	  confusion	  that	  arises	  once	  the	  accused	  has	  the	  opportunity	  to	  speak,	  but	  doesn’t	   take	   it.	  Hamer’s	  work	  argues	   that	   the	  use	  of	   silence	  as	   criminal	  evidence	   can	   be	   either	   ‘weak’	   or	   ‘strong’.48	   The	   ‘weak’	   use	   of	   silence	   means	   the	  silence	  itself	  has	  no	  probative	  value;	  however,	  the	  incriminating	  evidence	  might	  be	  more	   readily	   believed	   because	   of	   it.	  Where	   silence	   has	   a	   ‘strong’	   use	   in	   proving	   a	  case	   is	   where	   genuine	   adverse	   inferences	   are	   drawn;	   that	   is,	   the	   silence	   has	  probative	  value	  on	  its	  own.49	  Hamer’s	  aim	  is	  to	  measure	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  silence	  proves	  guilt.	  Further,	  where	  adverse	  inferences	  from	  silence	  are	  prohibited	  by	  law,	  Hamer	   attempts	   to	   calculate	   how	   much	   probative	   value	   has	   been	   lost	   to	   the	  prohibition.50	  Hamer’s	  analysis	  also	  factors	  in	  other	  variables,	  such	  as	  the	  burden	  of	  proof	   in	   criminal	   matters—beyond	   reasonable	   doubt—for	   the	   purpose,	   at	   least	  theoretically,	   of	   enabling	   us	   to	   calculate	   the	   probability	   of	   a	   conviction,	   given	   the	  prosecution	   evidence,	   so	   as	   to	   determine	   whether	   the	   accused	   ought	   to	   give	  exculpatory	   evidence	   or	   can	   safely	   elect	   to	   remain	   silent.	   Hamer	   argues	   that	   the	  difficulty	  of	  conducting	  the	  probative	  value	  assessment	  has	  given	  rise	  to	  the	  extreme	  complexity	  of	  High	  Court	  judgments	  in	  this	  area,	  including	  Weissensteiner.51	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In	  large	  part,	  but	  not	  entirely,	  the	  complexity	  of	  Australian	  jurisprudence	  arises	  from	  the	  recognition	  that,	   in	  recent	  case	  law,	  the	  gag	  is	  applied	  to	  the	  trial	   judge.52	  The	   ‘right	   to	   silence’,	   whatever	   it	   is,	   seems	   most	   commonly	   to	   be	   litigated	   in	  appellate	  cases	  about	  the	  words	  spoken	  by	  the	  trial	  judge	  to	  the	  jury.	  The	  High	  Court	  cases	  that	  followed	  Weissensteiner	  are	  intent	  upon	  scrutinising	  what	  the	  trial	  judge	  said	  about	  the	  silence	  of	  the	  accused.	  In	  RPS	  v	  The	  Queen,53	  Azzopardi	  v	  The	  Queen,54	  and	  again	  in	  Dyers	  v	  The	  Queen,55	  the	  High	  Court	  examined	  the	  judicial	  comments	  to	  the	   jury	   about	   the	   accused’s	   silence	   and	   ruled	   in	   each	   case,	   by	  majority,	   that	   the	  comments	  impinged	  upon	  the	  right	  to	  silence.56	  	  Chief	  Justice	  Gleeson	  wrote	  a	  dissenting	  judgment	  in	  Azzopardi,	  reasoning	  that	  it	  was	  misleading	  to	  call	  silence	  a	  ‘right’;	  rather	  it	  is	  an	  ‘immunity’.	  He	  described	  the	  ‘right	  to	  silence’	  as	   ‘a	  convenient	  description	  of	  a	  collection	  of	  principles	  and	  rules:	  some	  substantive,	  and	  some	  procedural;	  some	  of	   long	  standing	  and	  some	  of	  recent	  origin’.57	  He	  said,	  invoking	  Weissensteiner,	  that	  the	  choice	  to	  remain	  silent	  was	  not	  a	  choice	   without	   adverse	   effect.58	   He	   noted	   that	   a	   criminal	   suspect	   or	   accused	   had	  many	  opportunities	  for	  speaking—during	  the	  police	  investigation,	  in	  instructing	  his	  lawyers,	   in	   response	   to	  accusations,	   and	  during	   trial—and	   that	  everything	   said,	  or	  not	   said,	  had	   consequences	   for	  what	   followed.	  He	   said	   the	  decisions	  about	  how	   to	  conduct	   the	   defence	   were	   ‘tactical’,	   and	   that	   each	   choice	   was	   met	   with	   an	  opportunity	  gained,	  or	  opportunity	  foreclosed:	  ‘Whether	  the	  decision	  is	  to	  speak	  or	  remain	   silent,	   it	   is	   rarely	   devoid	   of	   consequences.’59	   Justice	   McHugh,	   dissenting	  separately,	   also	   argued	   that	   silence	   was	   not	   a	   ‘right’,	   but	   rather	   one	   of	   the	  ‘immunities’	  protecting	  criminal	  defendants;	  the	  specific	  immunity	  at	  stake	  here	  was	  the	  privilege	  against	  self-­‐incrimination.60	  	  Despite	  his	  robust	  and	  exhaustively	  researched	  position	  in	  Azzopardi,	  McHugh	  J	  was	  again	  forced	  to	  disagree	  with	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  High	  Court	  the	  following	  year,	  in	   Dyers.	   In	   Dyers,	   the	   High	   Court	   majority	   endorsed	   their	   decisions	   in	   RPS	   and	  
Azzopardi,	   effectively	   gagging	   trial	   judges	   from	   saying	   anything	   adverse	   about	   the	  defendant’s	   silence.	   They	   also	   expanded	   the	   principle,	   limiting	  what	   could	   be	   said	  not	  only	  about	  the	  silence	  of	  the	  accused,	  but	  also	  the	  silence	  of	  potential	  witnesses.	  Dyers,	   in	  his	  defence	  to	  sexual	  assault	  charges,	  had	  advanced	  an	  alternative	  theory	  of	   the	   facts,	   in	  which	  he	  claimed	  to	  be	  with	  a	  woman	  named	  Wendy	  Tinkler	  at	   the	  time	  of	  the	  alleged	  sexual	  assault,	  but	  she	  was	  not	  called	  as	  a	  witness.	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The	   majority	   of	   the	   High	   Court	   allowed	   the	   appeal,	   reasoning	   that	   he	   trial	  judge’s	  comments	  to	  the	  jury	  interfered	  with	  the	  right	  to	  silence	  of	  the	  accused,	  his	  presumption	   of	   innocence	   and	   the	   Crown’s	   burden	   to	   prove	   the	   charge	   beyond	  reasonable	  doubt.	  They	  thought	  that	  the	  trial	  judge’s	  words	  had	  wrongly	  suggested	  that	  the	  defendant	  may	  have	  had	  some	  obligation	  to	  call	  a	  witness	  in	  support	  of	  his	  alternative	  theory	  of	  the	  case.61	  	  As	  he	  had	  in	  Azzopardi,	  McHugh	  J	  handed	  down	  a	  strident	  dissenting	  judgment:	  ‘Today,	   a	   majority	   of	   the	   Court	   again	   wields	   the	   anathema.	   They	   pronounce	   as	  heresy	   a	   principle	   that	   criminal	   lawyers	   have	   preached	   for	   nearly	   200	   years.’62	   In	  
Dyers,	   McHugh	   J	   was	   alone	   in	   demanding	   the	   right	   to	   silence	   only	   be	   claimed	   by	  those	  who	  are	  actually	  silent.	  He	  reasoned:	  	  the	   appellant	   did	   not	   remain	   silent.	   He	   asserted	   that	   he	   was	   with	   Ms	  Tinkler	  at	  the	  relevant	  time.	  Accused	  persons	  who	  make	  statements	  before	  or	  during	  a	  trial	  may	  often	  find	  that	  their	  subsequent	  silence	  leaves	  them	  open	   to	   adverse	   comments	   that	   could	  not	  be	  made	   if	   they	  had	   remained	  silent.63	  	  He	   distinguishes	   this	   from	   genuine	   silence,	   ‘silence	   maintained’,	   which	   could	   not	  invite	  an	  adverse	  inference.64	  	  Maintaining	   silence,	   literally	   keeping	   one’s	   mouth	   shut,	   is	   the	   object	   of	   the	  apparatus	   in	   the	   penal	   colony.	   The	   machine	   and	   its	   operator	   recognise	   that	  initially—in	  fact,	   for	  two	  hours—there	  will	  be	  resistance	  to	  keeping	  quiet,	  which	  is	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  gag.	  However,	  the	  prisoner’s	  gradual	  realisation	  of	  the	  futility	  of	  voice,	   and	   his	   eventual	   submission	   into	   silence,	   is	   his	   pathway	   to	   enlightenment.	  Kafka’s	  officer	  says:	  	  ‘The	   first	   six	   hours	   the	   condemned	  man	   stays	   alive	   almost	   as	   before,	   he	  suffers	  only	  pain.	  After	  two	  hours	  the	  felt	  gag	  is	  taken	  away,	  for	  he	  has	  no	  longer	   strength	   to	   scream	   …	   Nothing	   more	   happens	   than	   that	   the	   man	  begins	   to	   understand	   the	   inscription,	   he	   purses	   his	  mouth	   as	   if	   he	  were	  listening.’65	  	  The	   point	   is	   to	   eliminate	   the	   chatter,	   to	   forego	   interpretation	   and	   analysis	   and	  commentary	  and	  simply	  be	  quiet.	  It	  is	  a	  system	  of	  justice	  that	  demands	  silence	  also	  from	   its	  observers,	  who	  are	  described	  as	  closing	   their	  eyes	  and	   listening:	   ‘They	  all	  knew:	  Now	  Justice	  is	  being	  done.’66	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Kafka	   here	   advances	   a	   jurisprudence	   of	   silence	   as	   yet	   unrecognised	   by	  appellate	   courts;	   it	   demands	   a	   literal	   silence,	   one	   which	   is	   meaningful	   and	  universally	   understood	   to	   perform	   a	   crucial	   role	   in	   the	   criminal	   process.	   In	   the	  Queensland	  Supreme	  Court	   in	  2011,	   in	   the	  matter	  of	  R	  v	  GAJ,	   the	  court	  considered	  the	  appeal	  of	  GAJ	  who	  had	  been	  convicted	  by	  a	  jury	  of	  the	  rape	  and	  sexual	  assault	  of	  his	   step-­‐niece.67	   She	  had	   testified;	   he	  had	  not.	  He	  had	  not	   spoken	   to	  police	  during	  their	   investigation.	  The	   trial	   judge	  had	  not	  directed	   the	   jury	  about	  his	   silence.	  The	  trial	  judge	  had	  told	  the	  jury,	  ‘the	  choice	  for	  you	  is	  really	  between	  the	  complainant’s	  evidence	   and	  nothing’.68	  On	   appeal,	   the	  Queensland	  Court	   of	  Appeal	   held	   that	   this	  direction,	   essentially	   a	   failure	   to	   direct	   the	   jury	   about	   the	   accused’s	   silence,	   had	  breached	  the	  High	  Court’s	  ruling	  in	  Azzopardi,	  which	  had	  said:	  it	  will	   almost	  always	  be	  desirable	   for	   the	   judge	   to	  warn	   the	   jury	   that	   the	  accused's	   silence	   in	   court	   is	   not	   evidence	   against	   the	   accused,	   does	   not	  constitute	  an	  admission	  by	  the	  accused,	  may	  not	  be	  used	  to	  fill	  gaps	  in	  the	  evidence	   tendered	   by	   the	   prosecution,	   and	  may	   not	   be	   used	   as	   a	  make-­‐weight	   in	   assessing	  whether	   the	  prosecution	  has	   proved	   its	   case	   beyond	  reasonable	  doubt.69	  	  In	   other	  words,	   the	   accused’s	   silence	  must	   be	   accompanied	   by	   exhaustive	   judicial	  speech;	   the	   jury	   must	   be	   rigorously	   tutored	   in	   all	   of	   the	   inferences	   that	   are	  unavailable	   from	  silence.	  They	  cannot	  be	   left	   at	   large	   to	  experience	   the	   silence	   for	  what	  it	  is:	  the	  work	  of	  a	  judicial	  apparatus.	  In	  GAJ,	  the	  trial	  judge	  simply	  noted	  that	  the	   accused	   had	   said	   ‘nothing’,	   and	   said	   nothing	   further	   about	   it.	   To	   say	   nothing	  about	   ‘nothing’,	   the	   appellate	   court	   feared,	   would	   leave	   a	   jury	   to	   speculate	   that	  ‘nothing’	  means	  something,	  and	  so	  must	  receive	  prolix	  instruction	  in	  what	  ‘nothing’	  cannot	  mean.	  To	  demand	  speech	  about	  silence,	  to	  say	  something	  about	  nothing,	  invokes	  what	  Susan	   Sontag	   termed	   ‘devious	   silence’.70	   Literal	   silence,	   she	   recognised,	   forecloses	  the	  possibility	  of	  making	  art,	  and	  so	  the	  artist	  engages	  in	  a	  ‘rhetoric	  of	  silence’,	  and	  here	  she	  draws	  upon	  André	  Breton’s	  notion	  of	  the	  ‘full	  margin’,	  in	  which	  the	  central	  area	   remains	   blank,	   but	   the	   periphery	   is	   filled.71	   This	   invites	   an	   obvious	   analogy	  with	  legal	  judgment:	  a	  jurisprudence	  of	  silence	  cannot	  be	  a	  jurisprudence	  of	  nothing.	  Law’s	  authority	  demands	  language,	  words,	  speech	  acts	  and	  text.	  Appellate	  case	  law,	  then,	  provides	  reams	  of	  commentary	  about	  silence,	  scribbled	  margins	  crowding	  the	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empty	   space	  within,	   stentorian	   pronouncements	   about	   silence.	   Not	   unlike	   Kafka’s	  apparatus,	  which	   is	   supposed	   to	   operate	   silently	   but	   instead	  has	  begun	   to	  make	   a	  creaking	   sound,	   all	   of	   this	   noise	   is	   distracting	   us	   from	   experiencing	   legal	   acts	   of	  silence	  as	  meaningful.	  Furthermore,	   all	   this	   noise	   is	   distracting	   us	   from	   grasping	   silence’s	  meaning.	  Scholars,	   dramatists,	   musicians	   and	   philosophers	   all	   concede	   that	   the	  meaning	   of	  silence	   can	   be	   ambiguous,	   but	   it	   is	   only	   lawyers	  who	   demand	   that	   silence	  means	  nothing.	  Actually	   it	   is	  not	  that	  silence	  means	  nothing;	   it	   is	   that	  the	   law	  must	  refuse	  interpretation.	   Refusal	   functions	   as	   parsimony	   in	   the	   face	   of	   silence’s	   plenitude.	  Silence	  offers	  a	   suffocating	  overabundance	  of	  meaning	  of	  which	   the	   courts	  primly,	  wordily,	  decline	  to	  partake.	  	  
—TOWARDS A JURISPRUDENCE OF SILENCE Legal	   philosophers,	   legal	   semioticians	   and	   other	   legal	   scholars	   offer	   a	   plethora	   of	  perspectives	   from	  which	  we	  might	   examine	   silence,	   if	  we	   could.	   J.	   Dyson	  Heydon,	  when	   a	   law	   professor,	   prior	   to	   his	   elevation	   to	   the	   High	   Court	   bench,	   wrote	   that	  drawing	   inferences	   from	   silence	   was	   a	   matter	   of	   ‘logic	   and	   common	   sense’.72	  Andrew	   Palmer,	   a	   law	   professor	   and	   barrister,	   agreed	   that	   there	   is	   ‘a	   robust	  Benthamite	   common	   sense’	   that	   underlies	   the	   kind	   of	   reasoning	   evident	   in	  
Weissensteiner.73	   But	   for	   the	   legal	   philosopher	   Louis	  Michael	   Seidman,	   silence	   co-­‐exists	  with	   freedom.74	   Sometimes	  we	   are	   silent	   because	   ‘language	   imprisons	  us’;75	  sometimes	  we	  are	  silent	  because	  we	  are	  alienated.	  He	  wrote,	  ‘for	  speech	  to	  be	  truly	  free,	   there	   must	   also	   be	   silence.	   Whilst	   in	   some	   contexts,	   silence	   is	   freedom,	   in	  others,	  it	  is	  the	  necessary	  frame	  for	  freedom.’76	  For	  the	  legal	  philosopher	  Marianne	  Constable,	  the	  right	  to	  remain	  silent	  following	  arrest	  preserves	  ‘the	  trial	  as	  a	  space	  of	  proper	  speech’,	  in	  which	  anything	  that	  has	  been	  said	  ‘has	  been	  uttered	  in	  conditions	  proper	   to	   speech’.77	   Constable’s	   book,	   Just	   Silences,	   examines	   the	   operation	   of	  language	   and	   justice,	   and	   the	   spaces	   in	   which	   silence—specifically	   because	   of	   its	  ambiguity—collaborates	   with	   language	   in	   drawing	   modern	   law	   towards	   justice.	  Constable	   evaluates	   the	   potential	   for	   silence,	   as	   well	   as	   other	   contexts	   in	   which	  language	  is	  absent,	  to	  enable	  us	  to	  recognise	  the	  limitations	  of	  speech	  (or	  language	  or	  text)	  for	  achieving	  justice.	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In	   her	   scholarship	   on	   refugee	   claims	  made	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   sexuality,	   English	  legal	  scholar	  Toni	  Johnson	  has	  examined	  how	  silence	  operates	  in	  asylum	  hearings	  in	  the	   United	   Kingdom.78	   Her	   work	   resists	   those	   asylum	   decisions	   in	   which	   it	   was	  determined	   that	   a	   claimant	   might	   live	   without	   persecution	   in	   their	   home	   state	   if	  they	  live	  ‘discreetly’;	  in	  effect,	  these	  decisions	  order	  gay	  or	  lesbian	  asylum	  seekers	  to	  keep	  quiet	  and	  stay	  in	  the	  closet.79	  During	  their	  hearings,	  however,	  Johnson	  observes	  that	  some	  of	  these	  claimants	  deploy	  a	  ‘tactical	  silence’	  of	  their	  own,	  taking	  advantage	  of	  the	  ambiguity	  of	  silence	  in	  the	  legal	  process.80	  Here	  she	  begins	  to	  develop	  the	  idea	  of	  silence	  as	  a	  strategy	  of	  subversion,	  what	  she	  terms	  a	  ‘restive	  silence’.81	  	  Scholars	   within	   the	   field	   of	   discourse	   analysis	   agree	   that,	   in	   the	   face	   of	   an	  accusation,	  a	  denial	  is	  expected.	  The	  forensic	  linguist	  Georgina	  Heydon	  explains	  that	  there	   are	   rigid	   and	  well-­‐established	   rules	   in	   conversations,	   governing	   turn	   taking	  and	   what	   are	   called	   ‘preferred	   responses’	   when	   taking	   one’s	   turn.82	  When	   taking	  one’s	   turn,	   silence	   in	   response	   to	  an	  accusation	   is	   interpreted	  as	  a	   failure	   to	  deny,	  and	  an	  admission.	  She	  reasons	  that	  the	  invocation	  of	  the	  right	  to	  silence	  goes	  against	  all	  the	  rules	  we	  follow	  in	  the	  management	  and	  interpretation	  of	  conversation.83	  	  Dennis	  Kurzon,	  a	  scholar	  of	  legal	  language	  and	  legal	  semiotics,	  has	  surveyed	  the	  main	   studies	   of	   silence	   from	   the	   fields	   of	   psychology,	   sociolinguistics	   and	  sociology.84	   Silence	   might	   operate	   as	   a	   conversational	   mode,	   for	   instance	   while	  listening	   to	  others	  speak,	  or	   in	  a	  refusal	   to	  respond.85	   It	  might	  be	  used	  to	  allow	  an	  encoder	  to	  help	  a	  decoder	  decipher	  a	  message.86	  Silence	  may	  function	  in	  recognition	  of	  specific	  cultural	  codes,	  such	  as	  religious	  rites.87	  Silence	  may	  be	  interpreted	  by	  its	  context	   or	   silence	  might	   be	   recognised	   as	   existing	   on	   a	   continuum	  with	   speech.88	  Linguistics	  scholar	  Jef	  Verschueren	  offers	  eight	  explanations	  for	  silence:	  	  1.	  speaker	  temperamentally	  disinclined	  to	  talk	  2.	  speaker	  unable	  to	  decide	  what	  to	  say	  3.	   speaker	   unable	   to	   speak	   because	   of	   amazement,	   grief,	   other	   strong	  emotion	  4.	  speaker	  does	  not	  have	  anything	  to	  say	  5.	  speaker	  has	  forgotten	  what	  s/he	  is	  going	  to	  say	  6.	  speaker	  silent	  because	  others	  are	  talking	  7.	  speaker	  is	  concealing	  something	  8.	  speaker	  is	  indifferent.89	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Kurzon,	   though,	   argues	   that	   there	   are	   only	   two	   kinds	   of	   silence:	   intentional	   and	  unintentional.90	  In	   writer	   George	   Prochnik’s	   quest	   to	   discover	   how	   various	   individuals	   and	  groups	   have	   dealt	   with	   oppressive	   and	   unwanted	   noise,	   he	   noticed	   that	   early	  twentieth-­‐century	   philosophy	   was	   very	   preoccupied	   with	   silence.91	   He	   cited	  Wittgenstein	   (‘Whereof	   one	   cannot	   speak,	   thereof	   one	  must	   be	   silent’),	   Heidegger	  (‘Above	  all,	  silence	  about	  silence’)	  and	  Max	  Picard	  (‘silence	  points	  to	  a	  state	  where	  only	  being	  is	  valid’),	  and	  notes	  that	  these	  philosophies	  ‘resonate	  with	  this	  idea	  of	  an	  incommensurability	  between	  truth	  and	  our	  powers	  of	  expression’.92	  Examinations	  of	  silence	  feature	  also	  in	  the	  work	  of	  Max	  Scheler,	  who	  wrote,	  ‘Persons,	  in	  fact,	  can	  be	  silent	  and	  keep	  their	  thought	  to	  themselves,	  and	  that	  is	  quite	  different	  from	  simply	  saying	   nothing.	   It	   is	   an	   active	   attitude.’93	   The	   philosopher	   Bernard	   Dauenhauer	  distinguishes	  what	  he	  calls	  silence	  as	  a	  ‘positive	  phenomenon’	  from	  silence	  that	  is	  a	  negative	  or	  derivative	  phenomenon;	  derivative	  silence	  is	  a	  ‘foil’	  to	  speech,	  or	  a	  ‘mere	  gap’	  between	  words.	  For	  Dauenhauer,	  the	  difference	  between	  negative	  and	  positive	  silence	  is	  the	  difference	  between	  a	  pause	  and	  a	  silence	  in	  a	  Harold	  Pinter	  play;	  the	  pause	  punctuates	  the	  speech,	  or	  sets	   its	  pace;	  the	  silence	  operates	  as	  a	  theme,	  or	  a	  shift	  between	  themes.94	  Perhaps	  of	  most	  significance	  for	  a	  jurisprudence	  of	  silence	  is	  what	  Dauenhauer	  calls	   ‘deep	  silence’	  which	  refers	   to	   ‘the	  silence	  of	   the	  to-­‐be-­‐said’.	  He	  describes	   it	  as	  ‘silence	  beyond	  all	  saying,	  the	  silence	  of	  the	  what-­‐ought-­‐to-­‐be-­‐said	  in	  which	  what-­‐is-­‐said	   is	   embedded.	   Or	   perhaps	   better,	   the	   silence	   of	   the	   to-­‐be-­‐said	   tests	   all	   that	   is	  said.’	   Here	   he	   introduces	   the	   phenomenon	   of	   ‘tact’,	   the	   ‘not-­‐to-­‐be-­‐said’,	   reflecting	  sensitivity	   to	   a	   situation.95	   The	   silence	   of	   the	   accused	   reflects	   their	   knowledge	   of	  how—in	   circumstances	   of	   suspicion,	   accusation	   or	   guilt—they	   ought	   to	   behave.	  Tactful	   conduct	   acknowledges	   that	   if	   one	   has	   nothing	   useful	   to	   say,	   one	   ought	   to	  hold	  one’s	  tongue.	  A	   sensitivity	   to	   silence—its	   performance,	   its	   absence	   and	   its	   interpretation—would	  transform	  the	  jurisprudence	  of	  silence.	  To	  fully	  grasp	  what	  silence	  is,	  where	  its	   limits	   lie	   and	   what	   might	   be	   done	   with	   it,	   is	   law’s	   ongoing	   project.	   Since	  
Weissensteiner,	  Australian	  appellate	  courts	  have	  urged	  that	  we	  smother	  silence	  with	  words.	  This	  doctrine	  prevents	  silence	  from	  simply	  being	  heard.	  Silence,	  wherever	  it	  occurs	  in	  law’s	  jurisdiction,	  must	  be	  explained	  and	  explained	  and	  explained.	  In	  this	  
	   	  VOLUME18 NUMBER3 DEC2012	  164 
babble	   of	   explanation	   law	   misbelieves	   that	   it	   protects	   silence;	   further,	   it	   often	  misattributes	   the	   term	   ‘silence’	   to	   certain	   kinds	   of	   noise.	   Law’s	   commentary	  forecloses	  the	  possibility	  that	  silence	  might	  be	  deliberately	  ambiguous,	  that	  it	  might	  invite	  speculation,	  or	  that	  inferences	  demand	  to	  be	  drawn	  from	  it.	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